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ABSTRACT: The recent Affum decision (judgment of 7 June 2016, case C-47/15) represents a new step 
forward in the case law of the Court of Justice on the detention of irregular migrants. The Court, 
departing from its previous case law in Achughbabian and El Dridi, adopts a rather pragmatic ap-
proach, preferring to stick to a procedural argument (to forbid detention in order to ensure a fast 
return procedure) rather than indulging in the assessment of the compliance of the detention with 
fundamental rights. This new approach seems to facilitate the cooperation between the EU level 
and national administrations. The Court seems, however, driven more by the need to secure the 
effectiveness of the return procedure rather than the rights of the individuals involved. 
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I. Introduction 
Penalties inflicted over non-EU citizens unlawfully present in the territory of an EU 
Member State have been for a long time a subject of insurmountable tensions between 
the EU legal framework and the national administrations in charge of its implementa-
tion.1 Migration policy has been used by various national governments as an instru-
ment to exploit political consensus.2 On the other side, it is clear that the recent exac-
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1 See M. PROVERA, The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union, in Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies Papers in Liberty and Security, n. 80, February 2015, www.ceps.eu; V. MITSILEGAS, 
The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, London: 
Springer, 2014; S. PEERS, When can irregular migrants be detained in prison?, in EU Law Analysis, 1 May 
2014, eulawanalysis.blogspot.it; M. BORRACCETTI, Il rimpatrio di cittadini irregolari: armonizzazione (blanda) 
con attenzione (scarsa) ai diritti delle persone, in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2010, p. 17 et seq. 
2 See, for instance, the several initiatives on building walls at the external (but sometimes also inter-
nals) borders of the EU (Austria, Hungary, and France). More recently, see the referendum proposed in 
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erbation of the migration crisis represents a challenge for the current migration policy.3 
Cases like Affum,4 as it frequently occurs in the EU legal order, are the by-product of 
this tension: on the one hand, restrictions on migration policies have been abused by 
the national government to build consensus. On the other hand, it is sadly clear that the 
solutions proposed by the current European Agenda on Migration5 are far from reach-
ing the desirable outcome.6 As a consequence, it is increasingly difficult for Member 
States to restrain from the use of conventional deterrence strategies (which have how-
ever proved to be ineffective), such as, for instance, imprisonment and detention.7 
II. The facts of the judgment and the case-law of the Court 
Affum is an ordinary story among those of the many non-EU citizens who look for a bet-
ter life in Europe. Mrs. Affum, a Ghanaian national, has irregularly crossed the border of 
the EU in a not-well-defined place (most likely, being African, the Mediterranean route), 
and, as many others, decided to head north, in an attempt to cross the Channel Tunnel. 
Mrs. Affum was halted by the French authorities on the 22nd of March 2013 in 
Coquelles, close to the border of the Schengen Area, while travelling on a bus coming 
from Brussels. She was found without a valid document, consequently apprehended 
and placed in garde à vue by the decision of the local authority under the French legisla-
tion in force at the time of the arrest. Such decision was appealed in front of the com-
petent jurisdictions and, ultimately, the French Cour de Cassation referred the case to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.8 
 
October 2016 by Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of the Hungarian Republic, on the acceptance of the relo-
cation plan proposed by the Commission in March 2016. 
3 See generally G. CAGGIANO (a cura di), Scritti sul diritto europeo dell’immigrazione, Torino: 
Giappichelli, 2016. 
4 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 June 2016, case C-47/15, Sélina Affum v. Préfet du Pas-de-Calais and 
Procureur général de la Cour d'appel de Douai [GC]. 
5 Communication COM(2015) 240 final of 13 May 2015 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the 
European Agenda on Migration. 
6 On this point, see the considerations in the European Agenda on Migration on the fact that “[t]he 
EU’s return system […] works imperfectly” (p. 9). After one year, while some improvement has been 
reached, the situation remains critical. See generally C. FAVILLI, La cooperazione UE-Turchia per contenere 
il flusso dei migranti e richiedenti asilo: obiettivo riuscito?, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2016, p. 
405 et seq.; G. MORGESE, Recenti iniziative dell’Unione europea per affrontare la crisi dei rifugiati, in Diritto, 
Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2015, p. 115 et seq. 
7 See the study of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, which, considering the ineffectiveness of 
conventional detention, proposes other solutions. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Al-
ternatives to detention for asylum seekers and people in return procedures, 2015, fra.europa.eu. 
8 According to the information provided for by the Court, Mrs. Affum has been subject to detention 
for at least 20 days. See Affum, cit., para. 31. 
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The case law of the Court of Justice on the detention of non-EU citizens, albeit re-
cent, is conspicuous.9 The first case in which the Court was called to decide on a simi-
lar hypothesis of detention was El Dridi,10 in which the Court found the Italian legisla-
tion on the criminalization of the illegal stay within the country inconsistent with EU 
law. Another notable case is Achughbabian,11 in which the Court drew similar conclu-
sions about the French legislation establishing criminal sanctions for an irregular stay. 
In both cases, the Court pointed out in clear terms that a non-EU citizen cannot be 
imprisoned for the sole fact of being irregularly present in the territory of one of the 
EU Member States. After these judgments, both Italy and France took the decision to 
amend their internal legislation. France, however, decided to retain the sanction of 
detention (peine d’emprisonnement) for the irregular crossing of the national border 
(irregular entry).12 It is under this rule that Mrs. Affum has been placed under deten-
tion, after being apprehended. 
III. The questions for preliminary ruling and the arguments of the 
parties 
By its first question the Cour de Cassation asked if the situation of a non-EU citizen in 
transit between two Member States falls under the scope of the Return Directive.13 By the 
second question, the national court asked whether the exception enshrined in Art. 6, pa-
ra. 3, of the Return Directive, that allows the Member States not to take a return decision 
if another Member State should take that decision under a bilateral agreement14 in force 
before the entrance into force of the Directive in 2009, brings the situation of the non-EU 
citizen outside the scope of application of the Directive. By the third question, the national 
court asked in essence whether the sanction of detention for illegal entry provided for by 
the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile complies with EU law 
 
9 The Advocate General has summarized the complete list of precedents in his Opinion. See Opinion 
of the AG Szpunar, delivered on 2 February 2016, case C-47/15, Affum, paras 50-58. 
10 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 April 2011, case C-61/11, Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim. 
11 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 2011, case C-329/11, Alexandre Achughbabian v. Préfet 
du Val-de-Marne [GC]. 
12 Art. 621, para. 2, of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile.  
13 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on com-
mon standards and procedures in the Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 
14 Arrangement between the Government of the French Republic, of the one part, and the Govern-
ments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
of the other part, concerning the taking charge of persons at the common borders between France and 
the territory of the Benelux States, signed in Paris on 16 April 1964. The arrangement does not appear to 
be bilateral at first glance. However, the Court, following the interpretation of the Advocate General in his 
Opinion, seems to consider the Benelux countries as a single entity. See Opinion of AG Szpunar, Affum, 
cit., para. 77. 
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and with the case law of the Court in Achughbabian.15 The French authorities, on their 
part, considered that Mrs. Affum was not in an illegal stay within the territory of one of the 
Member States, but simply transiting on a bus and that this was sufficient to escape the 
application of the Directive. Secondly, they relied on the fact that Mrs. Affum was coming 
from Belgium. Under an agreement in force between France and the Benelux countries,16 
the State over which the irregular migrant is unlawfully present has the right to send 
him/her back to the Member State where his/her journey started. According to the inter-
pretation of the French authorities, this agreement was enough to bring the situation out-
side the scope of application of the Return Directive. Thirdly, the French authorities held 
that the detention was in compliance with the Achughbabian case law as it was a propor-
tionate, dissuasive, and effective penalty for the illegal crossing of the external borders of 
the EU, pursuant to Art. 2, para. 2, let. a), of the Return Directive and to Art. 4, para. 3, of 
the Schengen Borders Code.17 This stance was contrasted by the Commission. In its view, 
the situation of transit clearly fell under the scope of the Directive, and the agreement in 
force between Belgium and France did not affect the compliance of the whole return pro-
cedure with EU law. The Commission also argued that the Schengen Borders Code was 
not applicable in this case, as Mrs. Affum was not apprehended while crossing the exter-
nal border of the EU. 
IV. The reasoning of the Court 
iv.1. The situation of transit falls under the scope of the Return 
Directive 
With regard to the first question, concerning the applicability of the Return Directive to 
situations of transit between two Member States, the CJEU upheld the view of the 
Commission. The Court apparently found that a different interpretation would not only 
run counter the purpose of the Directive itself, but it would be sensible to undermine its 
efficacy, compromising its effet utile. The Court also stated that the Directive is applica-
ble regardless of the movement of non-EU citizens, as it applies to every hypothesis of 
“illegal stay” within the EU territory.18 This recalls to national authorities that the territo-
rial application of the Return Directive cannot be restricted, as the convergence of na-
tional migration policies is a strategic area for the advancing of the process of European 
integration. 
 
15 Affum, cit., para. 43. 
16 See supra, note 14. 
17 Regulation (EC) 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 estab-
lishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders. 
18 Affum, cit., paras 47-50. 
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iv.2. “Illegal entry” and “illegal stay” 
The second aspect tackled by the Court deals with the legality, under EU law, of the sanc-
tion of detention provided for by Art. 621, para. 2, of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des 
étrangers et du droit d’asile. After Achughbabian, France modified Art. 621, para. 2, in or-
der to delete the crime of “illegal stay” within its territory, but decided to maintain the 
sanction of detention for the hypothesis of “illegal entry” into French territory.  
The Court, however, held that this provision is not compatible with EU law: “[t]he 
concepts of illegal stay and illegal entry are closely linked, as such entry is one of the 
factual circumstances that may result in the third-country national’s stay on the territory 
of the Member State concerned being illegal”.19 After all, the “illegal stay”, as a condition 
for applicability of the Return Directive, is a consequence of the “illegal entry”, punished 
by Art. 621, para. 2, of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile. 
The Court, however, stated that “illegal entry” and “illegal stay” are the only hypothesis 
in which the Directive limits the possibility of the Member States to apply certain crimi-
nal sanctions: once the return procedure has been concluded, the irregular migrant, 
who does not comply with the return decision, can be punished, as it happened for in-
stance in the Celaj case.20 In this instance, however, it was undisputed that Mrs. Affum 
was not subject to a return procedure. 
iv.3. Art. 2, para. 2, let. a) and Art. 6, para. 3, of Directive 2008/115 
Art. 2, para. 2, let. a), of the Return Directive states that Member States can decide not to 
apply the Directive to persons who are crossing the external border of the European Un-
ion. The Court however made it clear that Mrs. Affum has not yet crossed the external 
border of the EU, as she was apprehended before that border. Accordingly, in the opinion 
of the Court, the exception of Art. 2, para. 2, let. a), of the Directive cannot be invoked by 
the French government. Neither could it be argued that the situation was regulated by the 
agreement in force between France and the Benelux countries. The Court has been clear 
in stating that the exception in Art. 6, para. 3, of the Return Directive applies only to return 
decision, and not to the whole procedure. A different interpretation would be considered 
against the general scope of the Directive, which aims at establishing an effective return 
procedure, while, on the contrary, the application of the sanction of detention would be 
likely to slow down the above-mentioned procedure. 
 
19 Affum, cit., para. 60. 
20 Ibidem, para. 88. See generally E. PISTOIA, Unravelling Celaj, in European Papers, 2016, p. 705 et 
seq., www.europeanpapers.eu. 
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iv.4. Art. 4, para. 3, of the Schengen Borders Code 
One of the most relevant aspects of the decision of the Court in Affum is the clarifica-
tion of the circumstances under which a person can be detained according to Art. 4, pa-
ra. 3, of the Schengen Borders Code,21 thus developing the position previously taken in 
Achughbabian. In the present case, indeed, the Court recalls that the Schengen Borders 
Code leaves to the Member States the possibility to decide which sanction to apply for 
the illegal entry inside the territory of the European Union. Detention is not, however, 
the only option available, and consequently, the Member States cannot rely on this arti-
cle in order to justify a failure to comply with the Return Directive.22 
V. A new pragmatism of the Court? 
A relevant development of the Affum case is the adoption of a rather pragmatic approach 
towards the issue of detention of irregular migrants. The Court decided to address the 
issue of the detention of irregular migrants with a purely procedural argument: among 
penalties, detention (or imprisonment) is surely the most afflictive for the return proce-
dure, and consequently, it should not be applied to persons who have not committed any 
violation of the law, except for their own illegal presence within the territory of the Mem-
ber State. The Court declined to use other arguments: in particular, those based on the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights or on the working documents produced by the EU Fun-
damental Rights Agency23 on the use of detention as a last resort.24 The choice seems to 
indicate that the Court priority was to ensure the fastest implementation of the return 
procedure. It also seems to suggest that migration policy should become a field in which 
national authorities should strive for the highest level of cooperation, thus advancing the 
process of European integration. A good example of the pragmatism of the Court can be 
considered the decision not to quash the clause included in Art. 6, para. 3, of the Directive, 
that gives priority to agreements in force among MSs before the adoption of the Di-
rective,25 which is an exception to the general approach on the relationship between EU 
law and agreements concluded before its entry into force.26 
 
21 Affum, cit., para. 91. 
22 Ibidem, para. 90. 
23 Report of the Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on Alternatives to detention for asylum seek-
ers and people in return procedures (2015). See also European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
Report, Detention of third-country nationals in return procedures, 2010, fra.europa.eu. 
24 Fundamental rights, for instance, are quoted only once by the Court in the whole judgment. See 
Affum, cit., para. 63. Rather different is the Opinion of the Advocate General. See the Opinion of AG 
Szpunar, Affum, cit., para. 36. 
25 Art. 6, para. 3, of the Return Directive: “The Member States may refrain from issuing a return deci-
sion to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is 
taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of 
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In this sense, the decision of the Court to limit the use of detention to a minimum 
cannot but be approved. Even if there are time limits for detention, depending on the 
different national legislations, they can often be protracted much longer than reasona-
ble, affecting the return procedure, while at the same time conditioning the penitentiary 
system in that State.  
While, on one hand, the decision of the Court of Justice not to tackle directly the 
fundamental rights argument can be welcomed by national administrations, on the 
other hand, it cannot be excluded that another international human rights jurisdiction 
will have a say on the very same decision.27 However, in this case, the Court did not 
seem particularly concerned by this circumstance, as its main priority appears to ensure 
a fast deployment of the return procedure and to foster the cooperation between na-
tional authorities. It is not by chance, perhaps, that this decision was adopted in the 
middle of the process of adoption of the new Regulation on the European Costal and 
Border Guard, which makes a considerable effort in increasing the efficiency of the re-
turn procedures.28 The Regulation, which entered into force on the 6th of October 2016, 
provides for the organization, inter alia, of small teams of intervention to be deployed 
to organize returns.29 
 
entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country 
national concerned shall apply paragraph 1”. 
26 On this point, see F. CASOLARI, EU Member States’ International Engagements in AFSJ Domain: Bet-
ween Subordination, Complementarity and Incorporation, in L.S. ROSSI, C. FLAESH-MOUGIN (dir.), La dimen-
sion extérieure de l’espace de liberté, sécurité et justice de l’Union européenne après le Traité de Lis-
bonne, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2013, p. 27. 
27 It cannot be excluded, for instance, that the final decision of the national court will also be 
brought to the attention of the European Court of Human Rights (once all the internal remedies are ex-
hausted). In this sense, it is important to recall the interaction between the system of protection of fun-
damental rights of the EU and of the European Convention on Human Rights. While the EU is not a part of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Convention 
constitute, according to Art. 6, para. 3, TEU, general principles of EU law. At the same time, all the 28 EU 
Member States are also Contracting Parties of the Convention. On this point, see European Court of Hu-
man Rights, judgment of 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 388, where 
the Strasbourg Court reminds that: “[t]he Convention did not prevent the Contracting Parties from trans-
ferring sovereign powers to an international organisation for the purposes of cooperation in certain fields 
of activity (see Bosphorus, cit., para. 152). The States nevertheless remain responsible under the Conven-
tion for all actions and omissions of their bodies under their domestic law or under their international 
legal obligations (ibid., para. 153)”.  
28 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 
on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
29 The European return intervention team, Art. 32 of the new Regulation 2016/1624. 
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VI. Conclusions 
All in all, Affum seems to set the scene on which the many items of the EU agenda 
ought to be discussed: the reform of the European coastal and border guard; the moni-
toring of the implementation of the EU – Turkey Statement of 18 March 201630; the en-
forcement of the new partnership framework with third countries;31 the revision of the 
Dublin regulation;32 and the new Asylum Agency.33 Read from this perspective, the 
Court seems to be ready to take up the challenge proposed by this new framework with 
an extremely pragmatic approach.34 Will this approach be enough to provide the neces-
sary legal certainty for national authorities as to when the detention of irregular mi-
grants is in compliance with EU law? The judgment seems to bring some light into the 
picture: while strongly reassuring the duty not to subject irregular migrants to detention 
before a return decision is issued, it clearly states that detention, under specific and ex-
ceptional circumstance, may be admissible; for instance, in the case of a non-EU citizen 
who refuses to comply with a return decision. 
 
30 European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs Report, Operational implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement, 2016, ec.europa.eu. 
31 Communication COM(2016) 385 final of 7 June 2016 from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on establishing a new 
Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration. 
32 Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless per-
son (recast), COM(2016) 270 final. See also B. NASCIMBENE, Refugees, the European Union and the “Dublin 
system”. The Reasons for a Crisis, in European Papers, 2016, p. 101 et seq., www.europeanpapers.eu. 
33 Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council COM(2016) 271 
final of 4 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) no. 439/2010. 
34 This pragmatism seems to be confirmed by another recent decision: Court of Justice, judgment of 
6 October 2016, case C-218/15, Gianpaolo Paoletti and Others v. Procura della Repubblica. 
